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Across Curricular Boundaries: Searching
for a Confluence Between Marital




We begin today with Socrates. Socrates will lead us
inexorably, though unwittingly, into a curricular experiment. The
experiment, in turn, will take us across continents and centuries.
It will go on for about forty-five minutes-no more, I promise. The
experiment will end with a true, and I think, funny, story. Of
course, there will be a moral. Then you will have a chance to ask
questions or make comments.
Socrates was a lucky fellow. He left no articles or diaries and
might have been lost to posterity. But, he had an outstanding
student who memorialized him. The student was Plato. According
to Plato, Socrates is supposed to have said: "[Tihe unexamined life
is not worth living."' The occasion was the sentencing phase of
Socrates' trial for heresy and corrupting the young. The jury had
already convicted him, and Socrates was explaining to the jurors
that neither fine, nor prison, nor exile would stop him from
teaching. The jury was sure, however, that the death penalty
would shut him up. So Socrates died for his craft.'
Of course, Socrates is still teaching, not only philosophers
and others inside the academy, but all of us. He remains both a
good example and a bad example. On the good side, there is his
idea that education is not a "cramming in but [rather] a drawing
out."3  Socrates thought that questioning students and engaging
them in dialogue allowed them to learn by generating their own
t. Joseph E. Wargo and Anoka County Bar Association Professor of Family
Law. I am grateful to Brandon L. Raatikka and Leaf McGregor, my research
assistants, past and present, respectively, for their help and support. My special
thanks to Leaf who stayed with me on this project through every detail!
1. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 372 (1928).
2. Id. at 401-02.
3. Hall of Fame: Socrates, EPIc THINKING (London, Eng.), Jan. 2005,
http://www.epic.co.uk/content/resources/email- newsletter/socrates.htm (last visited
June 9, 2008).
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ideas and reaching their own conclusions. The bad side of
Socrates is that he was a bully who relied on "tricks of logic" and
"the devices of rhetoric" rather than "coherent reasoning."4 His
method, according to one critic, included "[fllattery, cajolery,
insinuation, innuendo, sarcasm, feigned humility, personal
idiosyncrasies, brow-beating, insolence, anger, changing the
subject when in difficulty, distracting attention, faulty analogies,
[and] the torturing of words .... ." Thus, law professors have been
abusing students in Socrates' name since Langdell presided over
the Harvard Law School in the 1870s.6
Despite the negatives, I am going to take a leaf from Socrates'
book. I would like to apply his famous statement about the
unexamined life to the law school curriculum. I hope that in doing
so before you today, I will fare better than he did before his jury
2,400 years ago.
Taking Socrates' statement about the unexamined life and
applying it to the law school curriculum gives us the proposition
that the unexamined curriculum is not worth teaching or learning.
Thus law schools should be, and indeed are, constantly examining
their curricula, often in response to criticism from the practicing
bar and others interested in improving professional education.
The latest such criticism-just off the press-comes from the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.7 It calls
for, among other things, a more integrated law school curriculum.
It is that facet of the report that I want to explore in this talk.
I propose to share with you an experiment in integration. I will
take two parts of the curriculum that I teach. They are Indian
land transactions from Property, a first-year required course, and
marital contracts from Family Law, a second- and third-year
elective. Though at first glance they seem totally unrelated, I am
going to try to link them. Let me set the scene.
4. FREDERICK J.E. WOODBRIDGE, SON OF APOLLO 269 (1929).
5. Id.
6. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S, at 53 (1983).
7. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). A summary of observations and recommendations is
available at http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/files/elibrary/EducatingLawyers-




A. Indian Land Transactions
Johnson v. McIntosh8 is the very first case in the Property
casebook that my class uses.9 The plaintiffs claimed through an
organized group of land speculators. These speculators bought
two large tracts of land directly from Indian tribes in 1773 and
1775.0 They did not have the consent of the British government,
though it was required by King George's Proclamation of 1763."
The Indians later sold the very same land to the United
States. 2  The United States, in turn, sold the land to the
defendant, another land speculator. 3 From 1775 to 1810, the
plaintiffs and their predecessors tried to get validation of their
title from the appropriate sovereigns-Great Britain, then
Virginia, and then the United States. 4  When these attempts
failed, the plaintiffs turned to the federal courts as a last resort.15
They brought an ejectment action against the defendant." The
plaintiffs lost in the District of Illinois, and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed."
The editors of the casebook present Johnson v. McIntosh to
illustrate the basic proposition that it is the sovereign who decides
what are the recognized objects of property and what are the
protected relations in them. 18 Neither the plaintiffs nor their
predecessors had the consent of the sovereign to buy land from
Indians. Thus, as Chief Justice Marshall put it, "the plaintiffs do
not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts of the
United States . . .9
The Chief Justice, then sixty-eight years old and in his
twenty-second year of service on the Court, took the opportunity to
8. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
9. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 3 (5th ed. 2002).
10. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 549-56.
11. See id. at 593.
12. See, e.g., Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and
the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1088-90
(2000) (describing the sales from Indian tribes to the United States in 1803 and
1809).
13. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 560.
14. See id. at 562; see also Kades, supra note 12, at 1081-87.
15. See Judith T. Younger, Whose America?, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 243
(2005).
16. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 543.
17. Id. at 549-50.
18. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 9, at 11.
19. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604.
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lay out the governing land principle among European nations in
the New World. It was that discovery and conquest gave England
and its successors in sovereignty an exclusive right to extinguish
Indian title to land. ° Until this right was exercised, the Indians
could continue to occupy the land they possessed.2 1
Students view Johnson v. McIntosh with a jaundiced eye. To
them, it is a case of Indians against Europeans. I point out that
there were no Indian parties to the litigation, just two groups of
European land speculators. I also point out that the Indians did
well in this particular trade; they sold and got paid for the same
land twice. The students are unmoved. "The Indians were here
first," they say. "Justice thus demands a decision for plaintiffs
who claim through them." "What about the fact that the land
purchases were clearly illegal?" I ask. The students reject that
too. They say the Europeans "owned" the legal system; it was
skewed against the Indians. They tell me-as if I did not know
it-that now the Indians have lost all but a tiny fraction of their
original lands and that their efforts to regain those lands are a
continual source of tension in our society. We then leave the
subject to return later, as we will in this talk, for a look at three
Supreme Court cases, decided 151, 162, and 183 years,
respectively, after Johnson v. McIntosh.
B. Marital Agreements
In my Family Law class, we talk about the rules governing a
married couple and the couple's property, and we also talk about
the extent to which a couple can alter those rules by contract
between the husband and wife. We learn that while most
contracts between engaged and married couples are considered
"domestic" and therefore unenforceable, contracts covering the
financial details of marital breakup on death or divorce may
indeed be enforced.2" While it is possible to use a postmarital
agreement for this purpose, it is the premarital agreement, made
in consideration and contemplation of marriage, that has become
the favorite tool for so-called "breakup" planning.2 Accordingly,
20. See id. at 596.
21. Id. at 567-68 (holding that the Indian right to possession was, in fact,
extinguished by the governmental grant of the land to McIntosh).
22. See Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An Update,
8 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1, 15 (1992) (noting that contracts dealing with
personal ordering of the marital agreement are generally "thought to be
unenforceable because they run afoul of the well-established rule that it is
improper for courts to intervene in the married couple's daily affairs").
23. See, e.g., Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial
[Vol. 26:495
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the casebook 24 features Binek v. Binek,2 a prototypical case from
North Dakota.
In Binek, Theodore presented Ruth with a premarital
agreement two days before their wedding. 6 He told her that
unless she signed it, he would not marry. 7  He made no
meaningful disclosure of his assets or income.28 While he was
represented by counsel, Ruth was not.29 She, nevertheless, signed
the agreement and the wedding took place as planned. ° The
marriage lasted for almost nineteen years,2' during which Ruth
was the homemaker.2 At the time of divorce, she was seventy-two
years old, had only the most meager of assets, and, by virtue of the
agreement, would acquire no more. 2 Indeed, if the agreement
were enforced against her, she would have to go on welfare. 4
Ruth challenged the validity of the agreement, arguing that
it was involuntary, unconscionable, made without adequate
disclosure, and meant to be applied only on dissolution of the
marriage by death of a spouse, not divorce.2" She lost. 6 Both the
trial court and the Supreme Court of North Dakota found the
agreement valid. 7 As a result, Ruth left the marriage with
virtually nothing to show for her nineteen years of work in the
home." The students do not like this result any more than they
like that in Johnson v. McIntosh.
C. A Pattern Emerges
Thinking about my students' reactions to these two cases led
me to see a surprising confluence between Indian land
transactions and marital agreements. First, each deals with a
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891-92 (1997) (discussing the increasing
popularity of prenuptial agreements).
24. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW
132-35 (3d ed. 2006).
25. 673 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 2004).
26. Id. at 596.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 598-99.
29. Id. at 596.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 596-97.
32. Id. at 597.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 599.
35. Id. at 598.
36. Id. at 596.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 596-97.
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valuable commodity-lands formerly owned by Indian tribes on
the one hand and women's work in the home on the other.3"
Second, the legal system deliberately attempted to depress
the value of each commodity to make it less expensive to acquire.
It made the government the only legal buyer of Indian land and
the husband first the owner of-and later the only buyer for-
women's work in the home.
Third, both kinds of transaction, though outwardly
consensual in form, reveal elements of coercion in substance.
Fourth, though the law governing the validity of transfers of
Indian lands and the validity of marital contracts is settled, the
courts are unwilling to enforce it as to either.
To support these conclusions, I will have to give you a brief
overview of the historical developments in each case.
II. Digging Deeper: The Story Behind Johnson v. McIntosh
A. Explorers, Sovereignty, and Speculation
Let us start with Indian land transactions. The tale begins
in 1496 when Henry VII, the King of England, commissioned John
and Sebastian Cabot to discover countries which had "beene
unknowen to all Christians" and to take possession of them in the
King's name.4" The Cabots, father and son, were Italians living in
England.41 They made two voyages of discovery in 1497 and
1498. 45 John Cabot, along with four of his five ships, was lost on
the second voyage.' In the course of the first, however, he touched
down on the coast of North America; we do not know precisely
where." He thus became the man who, in the words of Samuel
Eliot Morison, "gave England her American title.""
The exact nature of that title and, incidentally, the title of
the Indians who were already in possession when the Cabots made
39. By "women's work in the home," I mean cooking, cleaning, childcare,
household management, and the like. This work is typically done by women,
whether they also work outside the home or not, so I call it women's work. See, e.g.,
Theodore N. Greenstein, Economic Dependence, Gender, and the Division of Labor
in the Home: A Replication and Extension, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAm. 322, 322 (2000)
(finding that even with increased rates of employment outside the home, wives still
generally "do the majority of the housework").
40. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE EUROPEAN DISCOvERY OF AMERICA: THE
NORTHERN VOYAGES 159 (1971).
41. Id. at 158, 161.
42. Id. at 179, 191.
43. Id. at 191-92.
44. Id. at 171.
45. Id. at 157.
[Vol. 26:495
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landfall was not clearly articulated until more than 300 years
later. The vehicle was the case I told you about, the United States
Supreme Court's 1823 decision in Johnson v. McIntosh. By then,
of course, England had been succeeded as sovereign, first by the
original colonies, and then by the United States."6
All three sovereigns adopted the same policy with respect to
Indian lands: private individuals were prohibited from buying
them without government consent.47  As one commentator
describes the effect of this land policy:
A free market inevitably would have led to bidding wars for
desirable Indian lands. While some colonists might have
favored an unfettered market for Indian land, Europeans as a
group would have been the losers since Indians would have
extracted higher prices for their acreage. . . . [I]t was
collectively efficient for Europeans to make their governments
the only legal entities empowered to buy Indian land. Single
buyers ... can drive prices down just as single sellers ... can
48drive prices up.
In a world where land speculation was the norm and everyone was
a land speculator, '9 the prohibitions did not succeed in preventing
unauthorized purchases from Indian tribes. But, they may have
kept prices down. ° The United States is said to have paid over
$800 million for Indian lands."' Who knows what the price would
have been in a free market?
B. Finding Coercion Behind the Contract
The next point of comparison between Indian land
transactions and marital contracts is the consensual or voluntary
form of the transactions, which nevertheless mask subtle, and not
so subtle, coercion. I owe this insight into Indian land
transactions to Professor Stuart Banner. In his recent book How
the Indians Lost Their Land, he points out that transfers of Indian
lands have, for the most part, been consensual in form, if not in
fact. He posits a continuum between conquest and contract with a
46. See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER
ON THE FRONTIER (2005) (tracing the sovereignty over the land in question from the
British Crown, first to an independent Virginia and then to the United States); Eric
Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 L. &
HIST. REv. 67, 86-88 (2001) (same).
47. See BANNER, supra note 46, at 11; Kades, supra note 46, at 69-70.
48. Kades, supra note 46, at 111.
49. BERNARD BAILYN, THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: AN
INTRODUCTION 65-67 (1986).
50. BANNER, supra note 46, at 12.
51. Kades, supra note 46, at 74.
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large middle ground between the two.5 He says:
At most times, and in most places, the Indians were not
exactly conquered, but they did not exactly choose to sell their
land either. The truth was somewhere in the middle. The
interesting question about Indian land sales is ... where they
were located within that middle ground at any given time or
place. 5'
From an Indian point of view and from that of my Property
students, the story is one of weakening power from the early-
seventeenth to the early-twentieth century. 4 In the seventeenth
century, when there were relatively few Europeans in the New
World and the power balance between Indians and Europeans was
close to equal, transactions in Indian land often were good for
both. 5 These early land sales were close to the "contract" end of
Professor Banner's continuum. 6 As the European presence in the
New World increased and the power relationship between
Europeans and Indians shifted, land transactions moved closer to
the "conquest" end of the continuum.5 The Indians' early consents
to land sales were more voluntary than their later consents to
removal, reservations, and private allotments of formerly
communal lands.5" Ultimately, land cessions ceased to be
"voluntary in any meaningful sense of the word, even as they
retained the form of negotiated treaties.""
C. A Failure of Enforcement
Going on, we come to the courts' failure to apply the
governing rules once settled. When Johnson v. McIntosh was
decided, the Indian right of occupancy was already widely accepted
doctrine.' But it was not enforced. As my Property students put
it, the Europeans owned the legal system. States granted lands to
settlers before the federal government had extinguished Indian
title.6' States bought land from Indians directly,6' though the
52. BANNER, supra note 46, at 3-4.





58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 4.
60. See id. at 168-74 (discussing several cases where Indians only maintained
right of occupancy on their land).
61. See id. at 190 (noting that the biggest blow to Indian land ownership was
states granting land to settlers even though only the federal government could
purchase land from Indians).
(Vol. 26:495
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Indian Intercourse Acts prohibited such purchases. 3
Enforcement of those Acts or even of basic contracts was
extremely difficult for Indian tribes. They faced formidable
barriers in bringing lawsuits. Even if the tribes could find, let
alone afford, lawyers willing to take their cases, contracts to hire
them had to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.' Then
there was the problem of finding a court able to hear the lawsuit,
and lawsuits required the consent of the United States."5 It was
not until 1966 that Congress passed a law giving federally
recognized Indian nations the power to bring lawsuits in federal
court without governmental consent.6
The Oneida Nation brought suit four years later. This suit
resulted in a decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, so-called "Oneida I.,67
In it, the Court recognized a federal cause of action for wrongful
possession of lands premised on the Indian right of occupancy
enunciated in Johnson v. McIntosh.' Eleven years later in County
of Oneida v. Oneida Nation, so-called "Oneida II, "69 the Court
further held that three Indian tribes could recover damages for
fair rental value of land presently owned and occupied by two
counties in New York. 7' Though the suit was premised on an
illegal land sale by tribes to New York State in 1795, 175 years
earlier, the Court held that it could nevertheless proceed.7
It is interesting to note that the Indian successes in these two
cases had nothing to do with the voluntariness of the underlying
62. See id. at 136 (noting that the State of New York directly purchased Indian
land even though the purchase was illegal and would come back to haunt the State
two centuries later).
63. See, e.g., An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse Act with the Indian
Tribes, 2 Cong. ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 330 (1793). A permanent Indian Intercourse Act
was passed in 1834 and is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
64. This was the state of the law until 2000. See Indian Tribal Economic
Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-179, §
2(f)(1), 114 Stat. 46, 47 (2000) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2000)).
65. See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41
AM. U. L. REV. 753, 769-70 (1992) (discussing doubts prior to 1966 as to whether
Indians had capacity to sue without federal consent).
66. Pub. L. No. 89-635, 80 Stat. 880 (1966).
67. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (Oneida 1), 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
68. Id. 669-70 (noting that Indian right to occupancy could only be
extinguished by the Federal Government).
69. County of Oneida v. Oneida Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
70. Id. at 236.
71. Id. at 253 ("One would have thought that claims dating back more than a
century and a half would have been barred .... [N]either petitioners nor we have
found any applicable statute of limitations or other relevant legal basis for holding
that the Oneidas' claims are barred or otherwise have been satisfied.").
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transaction. It turned, rather, on the fact that it was illegal when
it occurred.71 The argument, thought up by some ingenious
lawyer, goes something like this: we sold our land; the law
prohibited us from selling it without federal consent; we did not
have federal consent; the sale was therefore void; the land is still
ours!"3 This was a high point for ongoing Indian efforts to reclaim
their land.
But, the Supreme Court soon changed its mind. Only
twenty-one years after Oneida H, the Court decided City of
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.74 In Sherrill, the Court virtually
overruled Oneida If," while denying throughout that it was doing
so." The facts of Sherrill follow. In 1997 and 1998, the Oneida
Nation bought back land on the open market that had been part of
its original reservation, but which it had lost in an illegal
transaction with New York State in 1805." The City of Sherrill
tried to tax it."8 The Oneidas refused to pay. Sherrill brought an
action to evict them.8" The Oneidas sought an injunction to
prevent the eviction and a declaratory judgment that they were
exempt from taxation.8 The tribe argued that, since the original
transaction with New York was illegal, the tribe had never lost
title.8 2  The tribe won in both lower courts,' but the Supreme
Court reversed.'
The Court said that Oneida I and H involved demands for
money compensation.8 In Sherrill, the Oneidas were seeking
equitable relief. In the Court's own words, "the distance from
72. See id. at 232 ("Despite Congress' clear policy that no person or entity
should purchase Indian land without the acquiescence of the Federal Government,
in 1795 the State of New York began negotiations to buy the remainder of the
Oneidas' land."); Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 670 ("The rudimentary propositions that
Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal
consent apply in all of the States, including the original 13.").
73. See Oneida H, 470 U.S. 226; Oneida 1, 414 U.S. 661.
74. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
75. See id. at 221.
76. See, e.g., id. (stating that the Court is not disturbing its holding in OneidaI/).
77. See id. at 198.
78. See id. at 202.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 198.
81. See id. at 214.
82. Id. at 199.
83. Id. at 198.
84. Id. at 221.




1805 to the present day, the Oneidas' long delay in seeking
equitable relief against New York or its local units, and
developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations,
evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility ...
, The Court suggested that the only way the Oneidas could
revive their sovereignty over the land was to petition the Secretary
of the Interior to acquire it in trust for the Indians, thus
exempting it from state and local taxes.' This is a long and
difficult political process."
Repercussions from Sherrill were immediate. Seizing on it-
indeed significantly expanding it-the Second Circuit reversed a
$248 million damage award to the Cayuga Nation against the
State of New York for an illegal land transaction." It did so even
though the United States had joined in the action as a plaintiff"l
and despite the fact that the Cayugas were not seeking an
equitable remedy. 2 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.93
The future for Indian land claims in the courts seems bleak.
III. Marital Contracts and "Women's Work"
A. In the Beginning, There Was Undervaluing
We come now to marital contracts and the other valuable
commodity-women's work in the home. This story dates back to
the Old Testament and the Creation. In case you have forgotten
it, let me remind you that the Lord created Adam on the sixth day,
Eve after him." The Lord made Eve out of one of Adam's parts.95
She was designed to meet Adam's need.' The Lord married her to
Adam without ever asking for her consent. 7  This story is
incorporated into the Christian ideal of marriage, and that ideal
87. Id. at 221.
88. Id. at 220-21 (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000)). As the Court put it:
"[S]tandards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice' preclude the Tribe
from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold." Id. at 214 (quoting
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61, 71-72 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)).
89. See id. at 220-21 (discussing the "complex jurisdictional concerns"
regaining control over land entails).
90. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
91. Id. at 270-71.
92. See id. at 269.







underlay the two great legal systems that settled side by side in
the New World.9"
One of these legal systems was the common law. It came
with the English.99 The other was the civil law. It came with the
Spanish and the French.'" Though founded on the same ideal, the
two legal systems diverged in their treatment of wives. Under the
common law, the spouses were a single person; that person was
the husband.' The wife lost her proprietary rights and legal
capacity during marriage.' ' Under the civil law, the spouses
retained their individuality, 3 though, as in the common law, the
husband was the financially dominant spouse. 04  He was the
exclusive manager of community assets.'05 These were defined as
anything acquired by either spouse during marriage except for
gifts and inheritances.'" As in the common law, the husband was
responsible for supporting the wife and the family; the wife was
the provider of domestic services.' 7
The two systems settled side-by-side and a rivalry for
preeminence ensued.' °8  At first, common law ideas prevailed,'"
making the two systems virtually identical in their practical effect.
It could easily be said that in this period, under both systems, the
98. See Judith T. Younger, Lovers' Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the
Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349, 353 (2007) (discussing
the differences between the common law and the civil law but noting that the
husband was dominant in both).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 225-26 (P.B. Fairest ed.,
6th ed. 1967) (noting that historically the English common law considered a
married couple as one person, the husband).
102. See id.; see also 15 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
195 (1965) (noting that "a married woman was given normal capacity" in 1935).
103. See WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 60 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing the allocation of community
property as split between husbands and wives).
104. See id. § 61.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 66 (stating that exceptions existed to the presumption that all property
received during a marriage were community property-those exceptions being gifts
and inheritances directed towards a single spouse).
107. See Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32
CONN. L. REV. 249, 256 (1999) (noting that at common law the husband was the
head of the family and the wife provided household labor).
108. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 103, §§ 1-2 (discussing the differences
in marriage laws between the common law and civil law and the fact that some
American states used the civil law, while others used the common law).
109. See id. § 37 (noting that in many regions in America, the English common
law displaced the community property system).
[Vol. 26:495
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husband was the owner of the wife's work in the home. °"0
Ultimately, civil law jurisdictions shook off the common law's
early influence, while common law jurisdictions assimilated the
civil law's treatment of spouses as separate persons and
incorporated some partnership principles into their marital
property regimes."' The wife's legal position in the family
improved in all states."' One could say that she became the owner
of her work at home, but her husband was, as he still is, the only
buyer for it.
The wife receives no financial compensation for this work.
She accrues no pension or social security benefits because of it; she
is not entitled to workmen's compensation for injuries incurred
doing it. Though she is supposed to have a right to support from
her husband during their marriage, she cannot translate that
right into cash."3 We have seen a similar phenomenon with
Indian lands: a governmental scheme to depress the price of a
valuable commodity by limiting buyers to one." 4 Here it is again.
Looking back at Ruth Binek, a traditional wife in a long
marriage, we see her at divorce in a position similar to that of a
seller who makes substantial investments in order to provide
services to a monopoly buyer, her husband."5  He is free to take
his business elsewhere. As the American Law Institute describes
it in its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: "The older the
wife, the closer the analogy, since her age-related decline in
marriageability and reproductive capacity are the facts that place
her husband in a position analogous to that of the monopoly
buyer.""'
Let me assure you that Mrs. Binek, whose marriage occurred
in 1984 and whose case was decided in 2004, is still a prototype.
110. See Williams, supra note 107, at 256.
111. WEISSBERG & APPLETON, supra note 24, at 603 ("[T]oday, property division
at divorce reflects the notion of marriage as a partnership....").
112. Using partnership principles to allocate marital property resulted in
compensation for work that increased the value of an item of marital property. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.05 (2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (providing for
"Enhancement of Separate Property by Marital Labor").
113. See McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 345 (Neb. 1953) (holding that in
the ongoing marriage the wife's right to support is only what he is willing to
provide her).
114. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the implications of forbidding private
individuals from buying Indian land without government consent, thus eliminating
a free market for Indian land.
115. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 112, § 5.04 cmt. c (equating the position of a




The available data demonstrate
a strong persistence in traditional marital roles[.] [Wlives
continue . . . to sacrifice earnings opportunities to care for
their children [and homes, relying on] continued market labor
by their husbands. This pattern is [plain] even among highly
educated wives whose reduction in market labor [carries] sig-
nificant opportunity costs .... [Tihis reduction appears even
in marriages in which there are no children. ...
Modern notions of marital property came into being in about
the 1970s."" At divorce in both common law and civil law states,
assets acquired by either spouse, except for gifts and inheritances,
are now subject to equal or equitable division between the spouses,
regardless of title. " 9 There is also the possibility of, but not an
entitlement to, continued support from an ex-spouse in the form of
alimony or maintenance.' When a marriage ends by death of a
spouse, the survivor's protection in civil-law states is his or her
share of the community assets, 12 ' and in the common law states is
a statutory elective or intestate share of the other's estate.1
22
These financial prescriptions for spouses at the ends of their
marriages are the closest to pay that married women ever get for
the work they do at home. Ironically, they are commonly waived
by spouses like Mrs. Binek in modern premarital or postmarital
agreements.
B. Coercion Creeps into Marital Agreements
Like Indian land transactions, these agreements have the
appearance of consensual transactions but are coercive in
substance. They are couched in mutual language and justified by
saying that it is desirable for parties to craft the terms of their
own marital dissolutions. 12  In reality, they are always worth
117. Id.
118. See WEISSBERG & APPLETON, supra note 24, at 152 (discussing the passage
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in 1970).
119. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 112, § 4.09 (discussing division of marital
property so that "spouses receive net shares equal in value").
120. See id. § 4.07 cmt. a ("Relative earning capacity... can give rise to a claim
for compensatory payments."); see also id. § 5.05 (compensating a spouse whose
earning capacity is lessened due to being the primary caregiver for the couple's
children).
121. WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES iii (3d ed. 1991); see also Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital
Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 229, 235-38 (1994)
(describing the protections of the civil law community property states).
122. See WEISSBERG & APPLETON, supra note 24, at 600 (discussing the common
law division of property by "equitable distribution").
123. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 112, § 7.02 (defining the objective of allowing
spouses to accommodate their needs in marital dissolution).
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more to one spouse than the other and are rarely bargains
between equals. While my goal in talking about marital
agreements is to be even-handed and "politically correct," the fact
is that men are often the proponents of these agreements and
women are almost always the challengers. 14  Most represented
parties had male lawyers.'25
Typically, the spouse or prospective spouse with the greater
assets, usually the prospective husband, seeks the agreement from
the less wealthy spouse, usually the wife.'26 He wants to preserve
his assets for himself or others if the marriage breaks up by death
or divorce. The Binek case is still instructive. Mr. Binek
presented the agreement two days before the wedding, along with
an ultimatum to the effect of "sign it or I won't marry you."'27 He
thus threatened to breach an unenforceable agreement--the
agreement to marry. Some lower courts have recognized this as a
subtle form of coercion, only to be reversed on appeal.' 8
Another fact bears on coercion or the lack of voluntariness of
the agreement. It is that Mrs. Binek was unrepresented.'2 9
Courts say that representation by independent counsel is evidence
of voluntariness."' "Is not then the lack of representation
evidence of involuntariness?" My students invariably ask this
question. I reply that the courts do not see it that way, and I ask
in turn, "Why should an adult woman like Ruth Binek who has
chosen the dependent role in marriage and waived the protections
of the marital regime by contract be relieved of her bargain?" She
124. See generally id. § 7.02 cmts. c, d (listing a number of cases in which men
present prenuptial agreements at the "eleventh hour" before marriage).
125. See, e.g., Judith T. Younger, supra note 22, at 20-27 (reviewing cases and
determining that the prospective husbands are often represented by male lawyers,
while the prospective wife often goes unrepresented). If my use of pronouns occa-
sionally slips from a neutral "he" or "she" into "he" for proponent or lawyer and
"she" for challenger, I hope you will forgive me.
126. See id.; see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 112, § 7.04 cmt. d (noting that the
wife is usually the challenger of prenuptial agreements which were proposed by
men).
127. See Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 596 (N.D. 2004).
128. See, e.g., In re Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795, 798 (N.H. 2002) (finding that the
husband's threat of refusal to marry if wife did not sign prenuptial agreement is
insufficient to constitute duress); see also Younger, supra note 98, at 371.
129. See Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 596.
130. See, e.g., In re Estate of Crawford, 730 P.2d 675, 678 (Wash. 1986) (en banc)
(requiring independent counsel to have been used in signing the agreement in order
to enforce an unreasonable prenuptial agreement); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106,
116 (W. Va. 1985) ("[Aldvice of independent counsel at the time parties enter into a




had choices, and she made them. My students fall upon me. They
accuse me of leaving power out of the equation. What they mean
is that choices like Ruth Binek's are not made in a vacuum.131 As
one astute commentator puts it: wives' decisions are made "in a
world that women never made, according to rules they didn't
write."32 We still live in a world in which many of the things
women really want and need are unavailable-good part-time jobs
and affordable, reliable daycare, to limit it to only two examples.'3
In other words, "[tlo most women choice is all about bad
options and difficult decisions: your child or your profession;
taking on the domestic chores or marital strife;"'34 signing the
premarital agreement; or foregoing the marriage-to mention only
a few. The same is true of consensual Indian land transactions:
voluntariness was inextricably tied to power, and what was billed
as choice is better described as acquiescence in the least bad of
available options.'
C. Another Failure of Enforcement
Now to the last point of comparison between Indian land
transactions and marital agreements: the courts' unwillingness to
enforce settled rules. In a nutshell, to be valid, marital
agreements are supposed to be procedurally and substantively fair
when they are executed. 136 In many jurisdictions they have to be
tested again for substantive fairness at the time of enforcement. 137
The idea is to protect parties from unexpected, unforeseeable
events that may make enforcement unfair. ' Yet when we look at
the cases, we see that the enunciated standards are not being
131. ANN CRITENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 235 (2001).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 237.
135. See BANNER, supra note 46, at 6 (discussing the power dynamic in the
colonization of the United States).
136. See, e.g., DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797, 809 (Mass. 2002) (stating
that a judge must determine whether the agreement "contains a fair and
reasonable provision as measured at the time of execution" (quoting Rosenberg v.
Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 672 (1979))).
137. See, e.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Minn. 1989)
("The court should also review, and make appropriate findings, with respect to
what effect, if any, the birth of the parties' child, and any sequences of that event,
significantly resulted in changed circumstances so as to trigger a further substan-
tive fairness review; or, to state it another way, whether in the light of those facts
the enforcement would be oppressive and unconscionable.").
138. See DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d at 807 ("[Tlhe disclosure [must] be such that a
decision by the opposing party may reasonably be made as to whether the




Taking those cases" ' decided by the highest state courts since
2000, we find that courts upheld agreements challenged as
substantively unfair at execution despite draconian terms."' Of
those challenged as substantively unfair at enforcement, all were
upheld except one.' That one invalidated an alimony waiver on
the basis of great disparity between the spouses' financial
situations but only for the limited period of three years.143 In all
the others, enforcement of the challenged agreements was found to
be fair despite the birth of children, marital misconduct, such as
physical abuse, adultery, and conviction of a drug-related crime,
lengthy marriages, disproportionate growth in one spouse's assets,
spousal disability, and being cast onto welfare by enforcement of
the contract. 144
Together the decisions display a lamentable disregard for the
spouse who, in the interest of the relationship, gives up the
production of income to devote herself to the family enterprise. 141
When it fails, she is left to carry the whole financial risk.4 6 The
courts, as they decide these cases, make some revealing
statements. As one court put it, "[iut is only where the contesting
party is essentially stripped of substantially all marital interests
that a judge may determine that an ... agreement is not 'fair and
reasonable."' 147
The decline of substantive review enhances the importance of
procedural fairness. Yet when we turn to it, the picture is equally
bleak. The judicial sense of what is procedurally fair is just as
deficient as the judicial sense of what is substantively fair. The
litigated cases reveal the recurring Binek pattern." The
prospective spouse with the greater assets and earning power
wants the agreement, has it drafted by his lawyer, and presents it
to the other prospective spouse very close to the time of the
impending marriage. Then, the emotional stakes and the social
pressures make it very hard to change course and almost




142. See Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006).
143. Id. at 579-81.
144. See Younger, supra note 98, at 349, 405-11.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797, 809 (Mass. 2002).
148. See supra Part I.B for a description of Binek.
20081
Law and Inequality
impossible to dispassionately evaluate the consequences of signing
the agreement. More often than not, the proposed agreement is
accompanied by an ultimatum-if it is not signed, then there will
be no wedding. Prospective wife signs it, and when the
relationship deteriorates, the voluntariness of the agreement often
becomes an issue. The cases demonstrate the prevailing view that
the ultimatum is not the kind of coercion that makes an
agreement involuntary. A further inquiry into voluntariness
should, as my students point out, consider the role of counsel. As
we said before, representation by counsel is, perhaps, the best
evidence that the party made the agreement voluntarily. Yet
cases in which both parties are represented are the exception
rather than the rule. 1
49
In most cases, wives like Mrs. Binek are unrepresented at the
agreement's execution, and the agreement is presented so close to
the wedding that there is no real opportunity for her to get counsel
or for counsel to go over the agreement. 5 ' In some cases wife's
counsel is procured, paid for by, or connected to, husband in some
way."' This raises questions about independence. Ethics rules
require that such a lawyer disclose the fee arrangement or other
connection, explain it as creating a possible conflict of interest, and
get wife to consent to or waive any conflict.' This was not done in
any of the cases in my sample group. In one case, the trial court
invalidated a premarital agreement on the basis of such an ethical
infraction, only to be reversed on appeal. 1
3
The last procedural safeguard which many jurisdictions say
they require for enforcement of these agreements is that the
parties have disclosed their finances to each other."4 But courts
are diluting the disclosure requirement. They hold, as in Binek,
that prospective wife knew enough about the prospective
husband's finances even though no disclosure was made. 15' They
hold that disclosure was sufficient though no values were attached
to the listed assets. They transform the duty to disclose by the
149. See Younger, supra note 98, at 389, 409. Of all the cases cited in the article,
only two involved representation for both parties.
150. See id. at 423.
151. See id. at 407 (citing a case in which the wife's attorney was recommended
by the husband's friend and paid for by the husband).
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2005).
153. Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533 (Conn. 2007).
154. See Younger, supra note 98, at 365-66 n.156 (explaining Montana's
disclosure requirement).
155. See, e.g., Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 599 (concluding that the wife was
sufficiently aware of her husband's finances).
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wealthier party into a duty to investigate by the less wealthy
party.
In sum, courts are enforcing these agreements though they
do not comply with enunciated legal standards. As with Indian
land transactions, the rule of law is ignored.
Conclusion
I am about to end my experiment in integration. I want to
close by pointing out how much I learned from it. Crossing
curricular boundaries enabled me to see a greater, grander, but
sadder picture of my two subjects. A rule of law, whether it be for
Indians or married women, is only good if lawyers will argue it
and courts will enforce it. Courts say one thing and do another.
Voluntariness is not what it seems. Choice is constrained by
power. Injustice is rife; so are ethical violations. Now that I am so
much wiser, what of my students? Here, I am reminded of a story.
I had just finished teaching Property for the first time. I had
graded the exams, turned the grades in, and was sitting in my
office, expecting student complaints. I heard a knock at the door.
I said "Come in." The door opened to reveal a young man
with a bushy red beard and hair to match.
He said, "Hello, Professor Younger, my name is Myles Arbor."
"Hello," I replied, "what can I do for you?"
"I was in your Property class," he said.
"No, you weren't" I replied, "I've never seen you before."
"I never came to class," he said.
Nonplussed, but not speechless, I said: "What brings you
here now?"
"Oh," he said, "I came to thank you for the grade. You gave
me an A+!"
There is a moral, but what is it? I think it is that the
curriculum is important, but not very. Very important is the basic
truth that students are their own best teachers. Socrates knew it.
So did Myles Arbor.
Where does that leave law professors? Unemployed?
Employed in some job, but without any prospect of tenure?
Certainly not! I'm not proposing revolution, only a subtle shift in
emphasis. Instead of trying to teach our students we should be
trying to inspire them. Inspire them? Inspire them to do what?
Inspire them to do the hard work necessary to teach themselves, of
course!
Thank you for your patience.
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